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Phenomenological research has much to contribute to our understanding of grief. In what 
follows, I will illustrate this by focusing specifically on psychiatry, where there is particular need 
for phenomenological clarification. This need is exemplified by debates that arose in the run-up 
to publication of DSM-5, concerning the proposed guidelines for distinguishing grief from major 
depression. In DSM-IV, it is acknowledged that the symptoms of grief overlap with those of 
depression. However, a depression diagnosis is excluded in cases where symptoms are “better 
accounted for by Bereavement” (DSM-IV, TR, p.356). The proposal that this clause be removed 
from DSM-5 proved divisive.1 For example, Wakefield and First (2012) supported retention of a 
revised bereavement exclusion clause, maintaining that “bereavement-related depressions” 
should be distinguished from major depressive episodes in many instances where symptoms 
would otherwise meet the diagnostic criteria for depression. In contrast, Zisook and Shear (2009, 
pp.70-71) insisted that the vast majority of bereavement experiences do differ from experiences 
of major depression. Where they do not differ, their trajectories and responsiveness to treatment 
do not differ either. So an exclusion clause is unwarranted, given that a person can be both 
bereaved and depressed.2  
 
In the light of such exchanges, the need for phenomenological research is clear. If the 
phenomenology of ‘normal’ or ‘typical’ grief cannot be reliably distinguished from that of major 
depression, then any proposed distinction must be based on additional, non-phenomenological 
criteria. On the other hand, if there are significant phenomenological differences between the 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, the website of the Coalition for DSM-5 Reform: www.dsm5-reform.com (last accessed 15 May 
2015). It includes details of an ‘Open letter to the DSM 5 Task Force’. The letter addresses several concerns, 
including that of lowering diagnostic thresholds by removing the grief exclusion clause. An accompanying petition 
was signed by 15,339 people.  
2 See also Lamb, Pies and Zisook (2010), who propose eliminating the bereavement exclusion clause but also 
extending DSM-IV’s two-week duration requirement for major depression. 
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two, such criteria may not be required.3 This need for phenomenological clarification is not 
specific to the DSM-debates and applies much more widely. The questions of (a) whether and 
how the various forms of depression and grief are phenomenologically distinct from each other, 
and (b) whether any phenomenological differences are indicative of different trajectories and 
outcomes, are relevant to any attempt to classify, further understand, and respond to grief and 
depression, in clinical contexts and more widely. 
 
Ultimately, DSM-5 (p.161) settled for something that strikes me as rather unsatisfactory. It is 
stated that, although a response to loss may seem “understandable or appropriate”, a depression 
diagnosis should still be “carefully considered” where symptoms overlap. This requires “the 
exercise of clinical judgment”, something that should take individual history and the specifics of 
the situation into account. In a footnote, there is also an attempt to draw some phenomenological 
distinctions. Grief, it is noted, tends to involve “feelings of emptiness and loss”, while depression 
involves “depressed mood and the inability to anticipate happiness or pleasure”. Positive 
emotions still arise during grief, while depression is more pervasive and persistent. In addition, 
grief usually involves retention of self-esteem, which sets it apart from the worthlessness and 
self-loathing more typical of depression.4 Thoughts of dying also differ in content: the depressed 
person may feel that she does not deserve to live, while the bereaved person is more likely to 
think of joining the deceased.  
 
Why is this unsatisfactory? The first thing to note is the frequent use of quantifiers such as 
“likely to”, “tend to” and “generally”, which appear eight times in the footnote.5 That an instance 
of condition A tends to or is likely to involve symptoms p, q and r, while an instance of 
condition B is less likely to or tends not to involve those symptoms does not facilitate a confident 
diagnosis of ‘A and not B’. Furthermore, this uncertainty is unavoidable, given that the 
diagnostic criteria for a major depressive episode admit considerable heterogeneity. A range of 
different predicaments could qualify as ‘major depression’ by meeting at least one of the two 
                                                          
3
 A closely related debate, which raises similar issues, concerns whether or not complicated grief should be 
recognized as a distinct psychiatric disorder. See, for example, Lichtenthal, Cruess and Prigerson (2004); Zisook and 
Shear (2009). 
4
 Loss versus retention of self-esteem is also the principal difference emphasized by Freud in his famous essay 
‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (Freud, 1917/2005). 
5
 In order of appearance, they are: “likely to”; “tend to”; “may be”; “generally”; “generally”; “common”; 
“typically”; “generally”.  
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principal criteria (depressed mood and diminished interest in activity), plus at least four of seven 
supplementary criteria. Indeed, three of the supplementary criteria are disjunctive: weight loss or 
gain; insomnia or hypersomnia; psychomotor agitation or retardation (DSM-5, pp.160-161). By 
relying on permissive criteria such as these, a particular grief experience might be easy enough to 
distinguish from a depression experience of one or another type, but not from all the other 
experiences that are compatible with a major depression diagnosis.  
 
First-person descriptions of depression and grief are often very similar to each other. In both 
cases, the person may report a lack of interest in activities, a sense of estrangement from other 
people and social situations, feelings of meaningless and hopelessness, bodily discomfort, 
fatigue, and changes in the experience of time, amongst other things.6 However, I think the 
apparent similarity is often symptomatic of under-description. In order to determine whether or 
not a grief exclusion clause is required, it is not enough to appeal to the success or failure of 
cursory diagnostic criteria. Where they fail, there remains the possibility that a more detailed and 
discriminating phenomenological analysis will succeed. I am not suggesting that we should 
aspire towards a neat boundary, with grief on one side and major depression on the other: 
boundaries will always be blurred and there will be plenty of in between cases. Hence a degree 
of idealization is inevitable. However, this does not prohibit robust phenomenological 
distinctions. That there are cases falling in between A and B need not detract from the claim that 
A and B are structurally very different, any more than the existence of grey detracts from the 
distinction between black and white. And the ability to make clear, principled phenomenological 
distinctions can aid one in determining whether a given case is more like one or the other. Thus, 
as Pies (2012) points out, an “in depth understanding” of the phenomenology is needed, of a kind 
that “symptom checklists” do not facilitate. I have no doubt that many clinicians are already 
operating with something like this, in a way that has not yet been codified. However, this in itself 
is not a reason to dismiss the need for explicit phenomenological work, at least on the 
assumption that it is a good thing to be able to communicate the basis for one’s clinical decisions 
and to formulate shared standards for diagnosis. 
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 All of these themes are present in autobiographical accounts of grief, such as those cited in this chapter. They also 
feature prominently in first-person accounts of depression (Ratcliffe, 2015). 
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In addressing the phenomenology of grief, it is important to keep two issues distinct: (i) whether 
and how typical grief differs from major depression and other psychiatric conditions; (ii) where 
and how the line should be drawn between normality and pathology. Even if typical grief could 
be distinguished from all forms of psychiatric illness, it might still be regarded as pathological 
according to one or another criterion (e.g. Wilkinson, 2000). The phenomenological question is 
not only distinct from but also importantly prior to the question of pathology. If we want to 
assess whether or not a condition is pathological, it helps to have a good grasp of what that 
condition is. So a lack of clarity over whether or how it is distinct from something else is not a 
good starting point. Phenomenology therefore has an important role to play in refining our sense 
of what the relevant phenomena actually are, given that neither grief nor depression are currently 
conceived of in wholly non-phenomenological terms. In the remainder of this chapter, I will take 
some preliminary steps towards a comparative phenomenological analysis. This will involve 
sketching three important differences between experiences of ‘typical’ grief and major 
depression: 
 
1. Grief involves losing systems of possibility, while depression involves losing access to kinds of 
possibility. 
2. Grief involves dynamic perspective-shifting, whereas depression involves an inability to shift 
perspective. 
3. Grief involves a sustained ability to relate to and feel connected with other people, the capacity 
for which is substantially diminished in depression.7 
 
In both grief and depression, 1 to 3 should not be construed as separable components of 
experience that just happen to accompany each other, and neither is the relationship between 
them a causal one. They are inextricable aspects of a unitary structure; each implies the others. I 
concede that major depression is heterogeneous, a point that I have addressed at length elsewhere 
(Ratcliffe, 2015). The same applies to grief; even ‘typical grief’ no doubt encompasses a range of 
subtly different (and perhaps, in some cases, substantially different) kinds of experience. So, 
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 These same differences, along with several others, are mentioned by Lamb, Pies and Zisook (2010, p.23). In grief, 
they note, a sense of connectedness to others remains, as does the sense that things will or at least could get better. 
And what I will say about perspectives-shifting can be related to their observation that grief comes in waves, while 
depression is ever-present. I elaborate on these themes in a way that complements their approach. But I further 
maintain that these three aspects of experience are to be understood in terms of a single, unified phenomenological 
structure, in grief and in depression. 
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when describing the phenomenology of typical grief, there is inevitably a degree of abstraction 
and simplification. Even so, depression experiences have in common a pervasive sense of 
isolation, lack of dynamism, and loss of possibility.8 This can be contrasted with the underlying 
structure of ‘normal’ or ‘typical’ grief, and – I will add - ‘complicated’ grief. DSM-5’s remarks 
on comparative phenomenology are admittedly suggestive of the relevant phenomenological 
differences and can no doubt aid differential diagnosis. But there remains the risk of superficially 
similar symptom descriptions obscuring profound differences in how a person relates to the 
world as a whole and to other people, and of different descriptions obscuring commonalities. 
Phenomenological analysis provides insight into underlying structural differences between grief 
and depression experiences, thus facilitating a more discerning interpretation of first-person 
reports. What I will say here is very much a starting point, and it is somewhat schematic. My 
aims are to illustrate the role that phenomenological research can play here, and to sketch some 
potentially fruitful themes to explore, rather than to finish the job.9 
 
Projects and Possibilities 
Profound grief involves what I will call ‘loss of a system of possibilities’. Nearly all of one’s 
projects and pastimes can depend for their intelligibility on a relationship with a particular 
person. When one is confronted by that person’s irrevocable absence, they collapse. Consider the 
event of losing a partner. Person A’s activities may implicate her partner, B, in a range of ways. 
In a case of goal-directed action, A might do something because B has asked her to do it, because 
B needs her to do it, because B cares about the outcome, so that B can accomplish something 
else, so that a life shared with B is sustained or enhanced, and so forth. In many cases, it is not ‘I’ 
who does something alone, but ‘we’ who do it together for reasons that are ‘ours’. It is ‘we’ who 
care about a given outcome, ‘we’ who have made and continue to affirm certain commitments, 
‘we’ who depend on each other’s support to get things done. This dependence is not restricted to 
goal-directed activities and the larger projects in which they are embedded. Take the case of 
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 Of course, they can share various other symptoms as well, such a lethargy and bodily discomfort. However, for 
current purposes, I suggest that a selective emphasis on isolation, stasis, and loss of possibility is a fruitful one. 
9
 A detailed comparative analysis will also need to include a more discriminating account of the kinds of experience 
encompassed by ‘major depression’ (Ratcliffe, 2015). In addition, grief will need to be considered in relation to 
various other psychiatric categories, such as posttraumatic stress disorder. Individual and cultural variations in 
expressions, experiences, and interpretations of grief (including religious interpretations) will also need to be 
addressed at length. 
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going to a cinema simply to enjoy a film. Here too, B may be implicated throughout. Enjoying 
the film involves a sense of watching it with B and sharing in an experience. The two parties may 
interpret the film together, while they watch it and also afterwards. Even when B is not present, 
A may think about how B would react to the film, and A’s enjoyment of it may stem, in part, 
from being able to tell B about it afterwards and construct an appraisal of it in conversation with 
B. More generally, how a situation matters to A and the kinds of action it demands from her are 
symptomatic of cares and concerns that only make sense given her relationship to B. The point 
extends to how the world appears to A and the degree to which she feels comfortably immersed 
in it. Regardless of whether or not we want to insist that specifically sensory perception of our 
surroundings incorporates a sense of how things matter to us, it is plausible to maintain that we 
experience our surroundings as significant, as mattering, in a range of ways. We do not 
ordinarily need to explicitly infer the significance of a situation from a prior experience of it. 
Given different sets of projects, cares and concerns, an entity or situation might appear 
practically salient to us in any number of ways: as something that could enhance or interfere with 
a project, as interesting, enticing, exciting, disappointing or threatening.  
 
A wholesale collapse of practical meanings would therefore involve experiencing the world and 
one’s practical relationship to it in a profoundly different manner, and this is exactly how 
experiences of bereavement are often described. One loses a system of significant possibilities 
that was previously integral to the experienced world and served to regulate one’s activities, thus 
making it “impossible for us to actively engage in the world just as we had before the death” 
(Attig, 2004, p.350). For this reason, Carse (1981, p.6) describes grief as a “cosmic crisis”. Our 
lives, he says, can be so bound up with the lives of others that they “scarcely belong to us”. In 
the event of a particular person’s death, a system of possibilities that operated as a backdrop to 
meaningful activity is lost, and the world is profoundly different.10 This is a prominent theme in 
every autobiographical account of grief that I have come across, and is something that people 
express in a variety of ways (e.g. Didion, 2005, 2011; Hemon, 2013; Humphreys, 2013; Lewis, 
1966; Nussbaum, 2001; Riley, 2012). For example, Oates (2011, p.176) writes, “Without 
meaning, the world is things. And these things multiplied to infinity”. Her account emphasizes 
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 This is sometimes described in terms of lost ‘assumptions’. Something that one habitually presupposed, took for 
granted, and came to depend upon is lost: “When somebody dies a whole set of assumptions about the world that 
relied upon the other person for their validity are suddenly invalidated” (Parkes, 1986, p.90). 
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how, when one grieves, entities in general appear bereft of the practical meanings they once had. 
Everything therefore looks strange, somehow different. Instead of being greeted by objects and 
situations that are relevant in the light of one’s concerns, one encounters bare, indifferent 
‘things’.  
 
All of this appears markedly similar to losses of possibility that feature in first-person accounts 
of depression. However, there is a distinction to be drawn between losing a ‘system of 
possibilities’ and losing access to ‘types of possibility’. For instance, no longer being able to 
hope for something or other differs from no longer being able to entertain an attitude of the kind 
‘hope’. The type of grief experience I have described involves the former. One no longer finds 
things significant in the ways one did, and one can no longer sustain a system of hopes that 
depended upon one’s relationship with the deceased. It could even be that a system of 
possibilities is eroded to such an extent that all hopes with a specific content, the hope for this 
and the hope for that, have been lost. Even so, one remains capable of finding things practically 
significant, capable of hoping. At the very least, what endures is an inchoate sense that life could 
one day be better than it currently is.11 The point applies equally to goal-directed projects, 
enjoyable pastimes, and so forth.  
 
What people with diagnoses of major or severe depression often describe is superficially similar 
to this but importantly different: an experience of losing the capacity for hope or for certain kinds 
of hope, of losing the ability to find anything significant in one or another way. As with grief, 
this permeates how one experiences and relates to the world. But there is a sense of stasis, 
inescapability, irrevocability, which sets it apart from losing a system of possibilities. Hence 
there are two qualitatively different ways in which life might seem pointless and activities 
meaningless. One could lose a token system of possibilities, of a kind that sustains specific 
projects and patterns of activity, or one could lose phenomenological access to types of 
possibility, to the sense that anything ever could be relevantly different from the present in a 
good way, that any project ever could be sustainable. First-person accounts of clinical depression 
generally indicate the latter:  
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 This corresponds to what Lear (2006) calls ‘radical hope’. See Ratcliffe (2015, Chapter 4) for a discussion of 




“When I'm depressed life never seems worth living. I can never think about how my life is different 
from when I'm not depressed. I think that my life will never change and that I will always be 
depressed. Thinking about the future makes my depression even worse because I can't bear to think 
of being depressed my whole life. I forget what my life is like when I'm not depressed and feel that 
my life and future is pointless.” 
“When depressed I feel I have no future and lose any hope in things improving in my life. I just feel 
generally hopeless.” 
“There seemed to be no future, no possibility that I could ever be happy again or that life was worth 
living.” 
“Life will never end, or change. Everything is negative. I lose my imagination, in particular, being 
able to imagine any different state other than depression. Life is a chore.”12 
 
Having ‘no future’ is also a prominent theme in many accounts of grief, but there is a difference 
between an inchoate, uncertain future that is bereft of possibilities one previously took for 
granted and a future that no longer incorporates the possibility for any kind of positive change.13 
It can be added that the experience of losing a system of possibilities in grief is at the same time 
the experience of a particular person’s irrevocable absence. The deceased was not simply an 
entity within the world that one cared deeply about (and continues to care deeply about) but also 
a condition of intelligibility for one’s world, for a system of significant possibilities that were 
once integral to the experienced environment. Hence the loss of that person, when recognized as 
such, implies a more general change in one’s world. The death of a system of possibilities is 
inextricable from the death of the person; a singular experience is both localized and all-
enveloping. This combination of specificity and generality is, in my view, of considerable 
philosophical interest. It is commonplace in philosophy to distinguish between intentional states 
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 These testimonies were obtained via a questionnaire study, conducted as part of the 2009-2012 AHRC- and DFG-
funded project ‘Emotional Experience in Depression: A Philosophical Study’. For a detailed discussion of the 
questionnaire, see Ratcliffe (2015, Chapter 1). 
13
 Hence grief and depression can also involve different alterations in the structure of temporal experience. I have 
argued elsewhere that temporal experience in depression, like depression itself, is highly variable. Nevertheless, 
there is a difference between inhabiting a world where the future offers no prospect of significant change (or no 
prospect of positive change, at least) and feeling ‘lost’, insofar as the future is no longer experienced in the light of a 
specific system of projects. This difference, amongst others, serves to distinguish temporal experience in many (but 
not all) cases of grief from experiences of time that are more typical of depression (Ratcliffe, 2015, Chapter 7). For 
further discussion of temporal experience in depression, see also Fuchs (2013). For a wider-ranging discussion of 
the varieties of temporal experience in psychiatric illness, see, for example, Minkowski (1970). 
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that have a specific object, such as perceiving or remembering something in particular, and 
diffuse states that have a much more general object, such as the world as a whole, or perhaps no 
object at all. For instance, we might distinguish an emotion of fearing something specific from a 
more enveloping feeling or mood of anxiety. Yet a singular experience of grief is both focused 
upon the loss of a particular person and at the same time a profound change in how one 
experiences and relates to the world as a whole. This is because the person who has died was 
both an entity within one’s world and also a condition of possibility for a world that was once 
taken for granted. So grief does not confirm to a distinction between specifically focused and 
more diffuse experiences. 
 
However, despite the all-enveloping aspect of grief, it does not involve loss of access to kinds of 
possibility (at least not to the same kinds of possibility that are lost in depression). There is a 
difference between no longer finding a wide range of entities and situations significant in a 
particular way and experiencing the world as altogether bereft of a certain kind of significance. 
In the latter case, nothing appears significant in that way and it also seems that nothing ever 
could. The world of grief therefore has a particularity to it that the world of depression lacks. 
Even where an experience of depression does seem to have a specific object, the alteration in 
one’s sense of the possible is further-reaching and not implied in the same way by that object. Of 
course, it might be objected that major depression is also diagnosed in certain cases where 
systems of possibility, rather than types, are lost. This is surely so, but one could respond that it 
should not be so. These two broad kinds of predicament are qualitatively different in structure. If 
major depression does accommodate both, then the category needs to be applied in a more 
restrictive or discerning way, thus distinguishing depression experiences where certain types of 




The contrast between losing systems and types of possibility points to a further difference 
between grief and depression: experiences of grief have a process structure that depression lacks. 
To quote C.S. Lewis (1966, p.50), “I thought I could describe a state; make a map of sorrow. 
Sorrow, however, turns out to be not a state but a process”. Of course, it can be added that 
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depression has a process structure too. Even if the world is experienced as bereft of the potential 
for meaningful, positive change, people still become depressed, recover from depression, fall 
back into depression, and experience different degrees or kinds of depression in succession. But 
my emphasis here is on the phenomenology: grief is experienced in a more dynamic way. The 
world of severe depression is experienced as unchanging and inescapable; one cannot adopt a 
perspective outside of it; one cannot re-live or imagine something that one could contrast with it. 
Grief, on the other hand, involves intensified interaction between contrasting and often 
conflicting perspectives. It is not the case that someone dies and a system of possibilities 
vanishes instantaneously. The bereaved person continues to anticipate things in a habitual, 
practical way, drifting into patterns of activity and thought that somehow implicate the deceased. 
These are then disrupted by the dawning recognition of loss. There is what we might call an 
experience of negation: one habitually anticipates certain things and is then confronted by the 
impossibility of one’s expectations ever being fulfilled. Hence there is an ongoing tension 
between competing ways of finding oneself in the world, different perspectival structures: 
 
Later, at the motel, I stand in the darkened living room and stare out at the dark ocean – a stretch of 
beach, pale sand – vapor-clouds and a glimpse of the moon – the conviction comes over me 
suddenly Ray can’t see this, Ray can’t breathe…..As I’ve been thinking, in restaurants, staring at 
menus, forced to choose something to eat. This is wrong. This is cruel, selfish. If Ray can’t eat…. 
(Oates, 2011, p.244) 
 
Furthermore, the bereaved person continues to remember what the world was like before the 
death. She can also imagine a counterfactual world where the death has not occurred. So her 
current predicament is experienced as contingent; it could have been otherwise. We should not 
conceive of these conflicting and contrasting perspectives as fully separate from each other; it is 
not simply that perspective a follows b, which follows c. Perspectives overlap, interact, and are 
reshaped in the process. Peter Goldie makes an insightful comparison with free indirect style in 
literary narratives and elsewhere, a way of writing that combines internal and external 
perspectives on a situation, usually those of author and character. He proposes that 
autobiographical memory involves a psychological analogue of this, something that is especially 




When you grieve, you often look back on the past, on your time together with the person you loved, 
knowing now what you did not know then: that the person you loved is now dead, and that you 
now know the manner and time of the dying.…autobiographical narrative thinking can reveal or 
express both one’s internal and external perspective on one’s tragic loss, so that these two 
perspectives are intertwined through the psychological correlate of free indirect style. (Goldie, 
2012, pp.65-6) 
 
Hence the gulf and the conflict between the world at time 1 and the world at time 2 is integral to 
the experience. When recalling time spent with the deceased, memories are infected with the 
present. Yet they also include a sense of one’s current perspective as a contingent one, as 
something that differs in a profound way from how things once were and how they might have 
been. Goldie (2012) further proposes that the narratives one constructs and revises during grief 
are inextricable from the grieving process and give it a meaningful unity. Grief is partly 
constituted by a variably coherent, dynamic story that envelops, connects and reshapes the 
various different perspectives. It is plausible, in my view, to construe this narration process in 
terms of the negotiation and reconciliation of perspectives. In contrasting past with present and 
re-narrating one’s memories in the light of the present, one fosters coherence, a sense of past and 
present as quite different and yet integrated into a unitary perspective upon one’s life. 
 
Depression, in contrast, involves a substantially diminished ability to shift perspectives in this 
way. One cannot ‘see outside’; things could not be otherwise. One might remember that things 
were not always like this, but one cannot rekindle a sense of what it was like or imagine what it 
would be like for them to be different. Lack of access to types of possibility applies not only to 
current experiences of and thoughts about one’s surroundings but also to memories, imaginings 
and expectations. Hence the narratives of those who are currently depressed often lack the 
movement between points of view that we find in first-person accounts of grief and in 
autobiography more generally. Byrom Good (1994, pp.153-5) observes that illness narratives 
usually include “multiple perspectives and disparate points of view, all representing aspects of 
the narrator’s experience and the possibility of diverse readings of what had happened and what 
the future might hold”. The point applies equally to grief. Indeed, given the gulf between before 
and after, the divergent points of view are especially “disparate” in grief. But Good goes on to 
note that this structure, this “quality of subjunctivity and openness to change”, is absent from 
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“narratives of the tragic and hopeless cases”. Grief thus involves a sense of contingency (it was 
otherwise; it could have been otherwise) that is lacking in depression. This is not to suggest that 
depression, insofar as it involves a more profound loss of possibility, must also involve greater 
distress. The grieving person is capable of imagining a world where the death did not happen. 
She might run through events in agonizing detail, wonder how they could have turned out 
differently, and think about what she might have - or not have - said and done. Moreover, the 
contrast between the world as it was and the world she now inhabits is ever-present to her, in the 
guise of habitual dispositions to act, ways of seeing things, and ways of thinking that she lapses 
into and then experiences as negated. A dining table that appears to her as it would have done 
were B alive, as though B were there for dinner tonight, there to talk through the day’s activities 
over a bottle of wine and a meal, is then recognized as somehow illusory; its qualities shift. The 
transition between these experiences adds up to a painful feeling of absence, lack or negation, 
which differs from a more pervasive and constant sense of absence that arises in depression. This 
is not to deny that depression also involves feelings of absence. For instance, one might remain 
able to anticipate -in some way- experiencing certain types of possibility, even though one is 
unable to experience them. Consequently, one is constantly confronted by a world that appears 
lacking. Even so, these two broad kinds of absence-experience are quite different in character. 
 
Interpersonal Connection 
Altered experiences of, and relations with, other people are implied throughout what I have so 
far described. In grief, projects collapse (to varying degrees) because they depend on a 
relationship with a particular person. And the interplay between competing perspectives involves 
a continuing recognition of what it is to relate to someone in that kind of way. In the case of 
depression, it is not so much that a specific relationship is lost; the sense of being able to enter 
into a type of interpersonal relation is eroded. There is a sense of insurmountable isolation from 
people in general: “when we experience everyday sorrow, we generally feel – or at least are 
capable of feeling – intimately connected with others…..In contrast, when we experience severe 
depression, we typically feel outcast and alone” (Pies, 2008, p.3). This isolation is inseparable 
from a sense of the world as bereft of possibilities for meaningful action. Almost all of our 
activities implicate other people in some way. Without any prospect of the relevant kinds of 




I do not wish to imply that, following bereavement, a person continues to ‘feel connected’ to 
people in general. She may feel profoundly isolated from everyone or almost everyone. 
Nevertheless, there remains an enduring sense of connection with the deceased. The ‘continuing 
bonds’ literature makes a convincing case for the view that typical or normal grief does not -or at 
least need not- involve ultimately ‘letting go’ of the deceased, ceasing to address her, relate to 
her, feel connected to her. Continuing relations with the dead are ubiquitous and healthy. Rather 
than “disengaging” from the relationship, it is renegotiated to varying degrees and in different 
ways (Klass, Silverman and Nickman, eds. 1996). There are several aspects to this. For instance, 
one might continue to communicate with the deceased, something that may or may not include 
an experience of reciprocity. It is also frequently observed that the bereaved engage in 
“searching behaviours” (e.g. Parkes, 1996, Chapter 4). Furthermore, when one habitually 
anticipates or actively seeks out the deceased, one may find him. Sensed presence experiences 
are not uncommon, and a range of more specific sensory perceptual experiences can also arise 
(Rees, 1971). Indeed, it has been reported that, in some cultures, perceptual or perception-like 
experiences of the deceased follow spousal bereavement in up to 90% of cases (Keen, Murray 
and Payne, 2013). It is debatable whether, when and why such reactions should be regarded as 
pathological. 
 
On the other hand, grief also involves repeated confrontations with the absence of the deceased. 
There is thus a complicated, dynamic interplay of presence and absence, involving habitual 
anticipation and its negation, perceptual and quasi-perceptual experiences of presence and 
absence, and a sense that the world as a whole is somehow lacking (Ratcliffe, 2016). But, 
throughout all of these experiences, one retains the capacity to enter into a type of second-person 
relation with others, of a kind that involves feelings of connection, mutual recognition and 
sharing. What is lacking and recognized as lacking is the ability to relate to a particular 
individual, at least in the way one once did. Depression experiences, in contrast, involve an 
experienced inability to enter into that kind of relation with other people, to ‘feel connected’ to 
anyone:  
 
“They seem far away, hard to relate to them.” 
14 
 
 “Nobody understand or loves me.” 
“There is the realisation you have never connected with anybody, truly, in your life. Family are self 
centred and shaming, either ignore comments which don't fit with their picture of how things 
should be going or they decide that shaming you into 'pulling yourself together' will sort it out.” 
“I feel detached from them.” 
“People change from being people who I love and am connected with to being hosts of a parasite - 
me. I can’t see why anyone would like me want me love me.”14 
 
Of course, a depression narrative may emphasize a relationship -or lack thereof- with one or 
more specific individuals. But there is also a wider-ranging change in the structure of 
interpersonal experience, an inability to enter into kinds of second-person relation that more 
usually sustain one’s projects and imbue one’s world with meaningful possibilities.  
 
However, it should be added that some grief experiences similarly lack the dynamism described 
earlier; the predicament can seem static, permanent. There is a global sense of disconnection 
from other people and even from activities that did not depend upon the deceased in any obvious 
way. But although such experiences -sometimes labelled as ‘complicated grief’- seem to involve 
a loss of possibility akin to that of depression, they are importantly different in structure. The 
stasis of depression involves feeling unable to relate to others, whereas the stasis of grief can be 
symptomatic of a resolute and unwavering second-person relationship with a specific individual, 
the deceased. There is an enduring interpersonal connection, of a kind that detaches the grieving 
person from the world of the living, from any sense of significant temporal change, from shared 
temporality. As Riley (2012, p.60, p.21) writes, “in essence you have stopped. You’re held in a 
crystalline suspension…..I tried always to be there for him, solidly. And I shall continue to be”.15 
Nussbaum (2001, pp.82-3) offers this insightful remark: 
 
We might add that what distinguishes normal from pathological mourning is, above all, this change 
of tense: the pathological mourner continues to put the dead person at the very center of her own 
structure of goals and expectations, and this paralyzes life. 
 
                                                          
14 These testimonies were obtained via a questionnaire study. See note 7 for details. 
15
 See also Ratcliffe (2016) for a more detailed discussion of Riley’s account. 
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So, while the world of depression is static and bereft of meaningful pastimes partly because one 
experiences oneself as incapable of certain kinds of second-person relation, the world of so-
called ‘complicated’ grief (one kind of complicated grief, at least) is similarly static but has a 
very different underlying structure: stasis is attributable to one’s continuing to relate to a specific 
individual in a certain way, rather than failing to relate to anyone in that way.16  
 
That said, there other grief experiences that do involve a pervasive sense of being unable to 
relate to other people in general, of a kind that is close to or indistinguishable from interpersonal 
experience in depression. I am thinking, in particular, of ‘traumatic grief’ (e.g. Neria and Litz, 
2004). This is sometimes identified with ‘complicated grief’, but differs from what I have just 
described. A central theme is the pervasive loss of what we might call ‘affective trust’ in things 
and, more specifically, in other people.17 A sense of security that was once presupposed as a 
backdrop to meaningful activities and to one’s relations with other people is disturbed. Nothing 
and nobody is encountered in quite the same way as before. One is vulnerable before people in 
general, in a way that interferes with the abilities to enter into second-person relations that 
involve a sense of connectedness, to embark upon projects that depend on others for their 
                                                          
16
 One might wonder whether and to what extent the kinds of experience I have described are specific to personal 
grief. Perhaps the break-up of a relationship, the loss of a job, one’s children growing up and leaving home, or 
moving to an unfamiliar country can all similarly involve losing systems of possibility, oscillating between 
conflicting perspectives and yearning for interpersonal relationships that are no longer available. Although there are 
considerable similarities between bereavement experiences and experiences associated with other kinds of loss, I 
think there is something distinctive about grieving over the death of another person. One is confronted with the 
prospect of irrevocable loss and absence. The experienced interplay between presence and absence, and the way in 
which one continues to relate to someone who has died, thus have a distinctive character (Ratcliffe, 2016). However, 
I am willing to concede that there are at least some cases where a person grieves in this way over the death of a 
nonhuman animal. 
17
 More generally, I want to maintain that the kinds of phenomenological change I have described in both grief and 
depression are essentially, although not exclusively, ‘affective’ in character. Feelings, I argue, are not generally 
experiences of the body in isolation from the environment; they also shape how we experience and relate to our 
surroundings and to other people. At least some instances of grief involve alterations in what I have elsewhere called 
‘existential feeling’, a felt sense of reality and belonging that is presupposed by all intentional states with specific or 
even very general contents. I construe shifts in existential feeling in terms of changes in the kinds of possibility that 
one is open to (Ratcliffe, 2008, 2015). Hence it might seem that typical grief does not involve a change in existential 
feeling, while depression and some forms of complicated or traumatic grief do. However, I would not want to insist 
that typical grief is bereft of ‘existential changes’. In fact, I think that certain aspects of the experience, such as a 
pervasive loss of confidence or sense of helplessness are plausibly interpreted in that way. Rather, my claim here is 
that typical grief does not involve an existential change of the same kind as that found in depression. If it is accepted 
that grief sometimes or always involves changes in existential feeling, the dual nature of grief -its specificity and 
generality- complicates my account of these feelings by problematizing my contrast between specifically directed 
intentional states and non-specific, pre-intentional existential feelings; it might turn out that a singular experience 
can be both. An interesting question to address is whether this duality is specific to the interpersonal realm, whether 
only a person can be both an entity in one’s world and a condition for one’s world. 
16 
 
sustenance, and to contemplate the possibility of a future that departs in positive ways from the 
present. With this basic sense of confidence, trust or safety gone from the world, types of 
possibility are lost (including that of experiencing and relating to other people in certain ways), 
rather than just systems of possibility (Ratcliffe, Ruddell and Smith, 2015). 
 
So experiences of grief can differ markedly, depending on how one relates to others, to the living 
and the dead. And, in some cases, the difference between grief and depression is greater than in 
others. Neverthless, an informative phenomenological distinction (admittedly one that involves 
substantial idealization and allows for borderline cases) can be made between losing specific 
individuals, along with associated systems of possibility, and losing types of possibility. This 
distinction may not track current diagnostic practice but, if that is the case, phenomenological 
research can contribute to a case for revision. 
 
Interpersonal Relations and Self-Regulation 
I have focused principally on experiential differences between grief and depression. However, I 
also think there are lessons to be learned from studying the phenomenology of grief that apply 
equally to depression and various other psychiatric illness categories. Reflecting upon the 
structure of grief serves to make salient the extent to which the regulation of our experiences, 
thoughts and activities depends upon specific individuals and other people in general. Profound 
grief inevitably involves some degree of detachment from mundane, everyday, norm-governed 
interactions with other people. But projects and pastimes prove resilient to the extent that 
continuing relations with others hold them in place and assist one in negotiating changes. In 
addition, the narratives that we construct around our experiences are influenced by interactions 
with others, and often co-constructed. It follows that the course of a grieving process depends, to 
a significant extent, on how the bereaved person relates to others and on how they relate to her.18 
Studying the phenomenology of grief thus serves to illustrate the -often insufficiently 
acknowledged- extent to which the experienced world, our sense of rootedness within it and our 
ability to act in meaningful ways all depend upon other people. A fully developed account of the 
various ways in which experience, thought and activity are interpersonally regulated may prove 
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equally illuminating when seeking to better understand all those cases of psychiatric illness 
where social isolation and estrangement from others are prominent themes. I am increasingly of 
the view that J. H. van den Berg (1972, p.105) was right in remarking that “loneliness is the 
nucleus of psychiatry”.  
 
Acknowledgements: Thanks to Matthew Broome, Andrea Raballo and Giovanni Stanghellini for helpful 
comments on an earlier version. 
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